RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-INDICTMENT

FOR PERJURY AT CREDITORS'

MEETING.-Sub-

division 9 of section 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act (Act of July I,
1898) provides that a bankrupt shall, at a meeting of his creditors, give
such information about his business dealings as may be required of him,
but that "no testimony given by him shall be offered in evidence against
him in any criminal proceeding." In Glickstein v. U. S., 32 Supreme Ct.
Rep. 71 (1911), the Supreme Court of the United States held that this does
not bar a prosecution for perjury for false swearing in the giving of
such testimony.
The earlier cases under the Act took an opposite view. In Re Marx,
102 Fed. 676 (i9oo), and in Re Logan, io2 Fed. 876 (igoo), it was held that
the giving of false testimony at a meeting of creditors was not a valid
objection to a discharge, because it was not a criminal offense punishable
by imprisonment, immunity being conferred by Section 7 of the Act. In
U. S. v. Simon, 146 Fed. 89 (i9o6), it was likewise held that the defendant
could not be convicted.
In Re Gaylord. 112 Fed. 668 (igoi), the court refused to grant a discharge, upon the same objection, but intimated that the bankrupt was
immune from prosecution. Edelstein v. U. S., 149 Fed. 636 (i9o6), and
Wecksler v. U. S., 158 Fed. 579 (I9O7), both decide that the immunity
conferred by Subdivision 9 does not extend to perjury at an examination by
creditors, and are approved by Chief Justice White in his opinion in the
principal case.
This immunity from the use of testimony does not prevent prosecution
for acts testified to upon examination; it is immunity from the use of
evidence so given, not from prosecution. Burrell v. Montana, 194 U. S. 572
(i9o3); 'Is re Walsh, 104 Fed. 518 (i9oo).
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURT.-A petition in involuntary bankruptcy having been filed, the bankruptcy court refused to appoint a receiver on the ground that a committee of creditors
had by agreement of a majority of the creditors, taken charge of the
bankrupt's affairs, and that there really was no insolvency. An action was
brought in the state court to recover the price of goods sold and judgment
was given for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of the state having
affirmed this judgment, aft appeal was taken to the United States Supreme
Court on the question of jurisdiction. Held, that the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings in a Federal court precludes a state court from proceeding in an attachment suit brought by a single creditor. But the refusal to appoint a receiver and the recognition of an adjustment of the
affair outside the courts, takes the matter. out of the hands of the bankruptcy court and the state court may resume jurisdiction. Acme Harvester
Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96 (1912).
The decision in this case is strictly in accord with other well considered
cases touching the same point. The bankruptcy court always has jurisdiction
over the property of an adjudged bankrupt, exclusive of the state courts.
In Re Reynolds, 127 Fed. 76o (i9o4); Beall v. Walker, 26 W. Va. 741; In Re
Lemmon, 112 Fed. 76o (19o). Even where the action in the state court
was begun before the bankruptcy proceedings, the Federal court having
jurisdiction over the latter action may stay the suit in the state court, It re
Potterfield, 138 Fed. 192 (igo), or the Federal court may, within its discretion, allow the first action to be prosecuted to judgment. Moore v.
Green, i45 Fed. 472 (i9o6).
Where an entire stranger to the bankruptcy proceedings, claims to be
the owner of goods in the hands of the bankrupt, nevertheless he will not be
allowed to prosecute replevin in a state court without the consent of the
(451)
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bankruptcy Court. In re Russell, ioI Fed. 248 (ioo); White v. Schloerb,
178 U. S. 542 (ipoo).
Obviously, none of these rulings apply where the bankruptcy court has
refused to take jurisdiction. Acme Co. v. Beekman Co., supra.
BANKS AND BANKING-PASSAGE OF TITLE TO CHECK DEPOSITED WITH
BLANK INDORSEMENT.-A check on another bank, indorsed in blank, was de-

posited in a bank without any special agreement or understanding as to
whether it was to be treated as cash or as a deposit for collection, and the
bank gave the depositor credit for the check as cash. The court held that
in such a case there is a presumption that the transaction constituted a
sale to the bank, and that title to the check passed to the bank, although that
presumption is subject to be rebutted by the facts. Downey v. National
Exchange Bank, 96 N. E. Rep. 4o3 (Ind., 1911).
There is a definite cleavage of opinion on the effect of a deposit of a
check indorsed "For Deposit" or in blank. Many courts hold, contrary
to the principal case, that the bank is merely an agent for collection, and
that title remains in the depositor until collection has actually been made.
Freeman v. Bank, 87 Ga. 45 (1891); Packing Co. v. Davis, 118 N. C. 548
(1896); Beal v. Somerville, 5o Fed. 647 (1894); City of Philadelphia v.
Eckels, 98 Fed. 485 (1896).
But in the majority of states, title passes to the bank at the time the
depositor is credited with the amount of the check as cash. Bank v. Miller,
77 Ala. 168 (1884); Doppelt v. Bank, 175 Ill. 432 (i898); Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336 (19o5); Auto Co. v. Bank, 81 At.

Rep. 294 (Md., 1911);

In re Bank, 72 Minn. 283 (1898); Bank v. Loyd, go N. Y. 530 (1882);
Bank v. McMurrough, 103 Pac. Rep. 6or (Okla., io9); Burton v. U. S.,
196 U. S. 283 (1904).
In practically all these cases, there was a custom by which the depositor could draw against such a credit, even before actual collection took
place. The courts which hold, nevertheless, that title remains in the depositor, explain this as a mere courtesy on the part of the banks. Packing
Co. v. Davis, supra. If the check turns out to be worthless, the bank can
always charge it back to the depositor's account, whether title has passed
or not, because in the former case the bank is not bound to buy the
check, and in the latter it has the rights of an indorsee against an indorser.
Noble v. Doughten, supra.
C1IMES-MATERIALITY OF TESTIIONY AS AFFECTING GUILT ON A CHAZGE
oF PERIuR.-Upon a trial for perjury the degree of the materiality of the
testimony upon which the charge is based is of no importance. Any false
statement made by a witness which detracts from, or adds weight and
force to, the testimony of any witness upon matters that are directly

material thereby becomes material itself and constitutes perjury. Coleman
v. State, i18 Pac. Rep. 594, (Okla., 1911).
The question of the materiality of the matter assigned is generally one
for the court alone, R. v. Courtney, 7 Cox C. C. 1n (1856) ; but
occassionally, as a mixed question of law and fact, it is left to the jury.
Com. v. Pollard, 12 Met. 225 (Mass., 1849); 2 Bishop's New Crim. Law, Sec.
1039.

The materiality may appear on the face of the indictment by examining
the relation of the alleged false testimony to the issue or it may be averred
in the indictment. State v. Vorrhis, 52 W. S. L. 356 (189i). That the
matter was material, however, must be clearly shown; it will not be presumed. Wood v. People, 59 N. Y. 117 (1875); State v. Aikens, 32 Ia. 4o3
(1871). Whether it is material or not depends, of course, upon the circumstances of the particular case.
In general, testimony tending to corroborate evidence concerning a
material matter is material. Com. v. Parker, 2 Cush. 2o2 (Mass., r851);
Wood v. People, 59 N. Y. 117 (1875). A charge of perjury, accordingly,
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may be predicated upon false testimony tending to increase or mitigate
damages, State v. Swafford, 98 Ia. 362 (1896) ; or to procure the admission
in evidence of a document that is material to the issue, Reg. v. Phillpotts,
5 Cox C. C. 363 (1853); or upon a false affidavit on a motion for a continuance, State v. Shupe, 16 Ia. 36 (1865); or for a new trial. State v.
Chandler, 42 Vt. 446 (i869). The fact that the evidence was incompetent,
is immaterial. Chamberlain v. People, 23 N. Y. 85 (i86). Nor does it
matter that the affidavit or deposition was not used, State v. Whittemore,
5o N. H. 245 (1872) ; but compare Monell v. People, 32 Ill. 499 (1865). So
also it is no defense that the evidence did not affect the verdict or decision,
Pollard v. People, 69 Ill. 148 (I88i) ; or that the testimony was privileged,
State v. Maxwell, 28 La. Ann. 361 (1876) ; or that the accused attended as
a witness voluntarily and without the service of a subpcena. Com. v. Knight,
i2 Mass. 273 (i865). See also Clark and Marshall on Crimes, pp. 658-662.
CRIMEs-THE ILLEGALITY OF THE TRANSACTION AS A DEFENSE TO AN
INDICTMENT FOR FALSE PRETENSES.-In Horton v. State, 96 N. E. Rep. 797

(Ohio, i911), the accused falsely pretended that he was selling counterfeit
money to the prosecutor.

In holding that it is no defense to an indictment for obtaining money

or property by false pretenses that the person defrauded parted with his

property to accomplish an illegal purpose, the decision merely follows a prin-

ciple adopted in nearly all jurisdictions. Comm. v. Henry, 22 Pa. 253 (1853) ;
People v. Martin, 102 Cal. 558 (894); Regina v. Hudson, 3 Cox C. C. 305
(186o) ; In re Cummins, 16 Colo. 451 (i8g1) ; People v. Watson, 75 Mich.
582 (1889); Cufnningham v. State, 6i N. J. L. 67 (1897); Lovell v. State,
48 Texas Crim. Rep. 85 (io5). The reasons for the rule are: (I) The
doctrine in civil actions that the guilt of the plaintiff is generally a good
defense does not apply to criminal cases because in the latter the prosecution

need not necessarily be instituted by the party defrauded: it is the state
which is seeking to redress a wrong done to the public. (2) Public policy,
for the crime of one ought not to be the shield of the other. See opinion
of Justice Cullen in People v. Livingston, 47 N. Y. App. Div. 284 (19oo):
"Where one offender is punished and another escapes, there may properly
be a feeling of dissatisfaction, but the dissatisfaction should not be because one man is in prison, but because the other man is out."
A contrary doctrine was laid down in McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 470
(1871). The later New York cases admit the unsoundness of their law but
stand committed to it by the early decisions, suggesting that the legislature
should alter it. People v. Tompkins, 186 N. Y. 413 (19o6). Other decisions
which hold that there can be no connection are State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271
(1876), and Foster v. State, 8 Ga. App. ii9 (i9io). The last case makes
a distinction between a case where the defrauded party believes he is getting something of value and where he knows he is getting something of
no va'te (e. g., counterfeit money), holding that in the latter case there
can be no conviction.
It is to be noted that the prevailing doctrine is not applicable to false
pretenses only but that it is a doctrine running through the criminal law.
Clark and Marshall on Crimes, 2nd Ed., Sec. 157.
DAMAGES--LOSS OF LATERAL SUPPORT.-In excavating for gravel on certain
land, the surface of the adjacent land fell in. Held, the damages recoverable by the adjacent land owner should be the cost of reconstructing the
land provided such cost would be less than the diminution of the value
of the land. Orr v. Dayton and M. Traction Co., 96 N. E. Rep. 462 (Ind.,

An owner of land has a right to the support of his land, in its natural
condition, by the adjacent land. This is an absolute right and does not
depend on the negligence of the adjacent land owner. Yandes v. Wright, 66
Ind. 319 (879) ; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. i99 (1877).
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As to the question of what shall be the measure of damages, if this
right is violated, there is a difference of opinion. It has been held, for
instance, that the measure of damages for the removal of lateral support
is the actual damage to the soil. Bohrer v. Dienhart Harness Co., 49 N. E.

296; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155 (1892).

This rule seems to have

found very little support. Another rule which has been laid down is that
the damages shall be the cost of restoring the property to its former condition with as good means of lateral support as before. Stummel v. Brown,
7 Houst. 219 (Del., 1885). But the great weight of authority holds that the
measure of damages shall be the dimunition of the value of the land as
the result of its loss of lateral support. Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind. 195
(1889) ; Schultz v. Bowers, 64 Minn. 123 (i896) ; McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J.
L. 356 (i856); Ulrick v. Dakota Loan & Trust Co., 2 S. D. 285 (891).
The principal case shows a tendency to limit the recovery to the
smallest amount of damages which will adequately protect and reimburse
the plaintiff. It seems, however, to be in accord with the prevailing view
as to the proper measure of damages.

EVIDENcE-THE VALUE OF DYING DECLARATION.-In People v. Falletto,
96 N. E. Rep. 355 (N. Y., 1911), Vann, J., in discussing the admissibility of
dying declarations in evidence, said: "Dying declarations are dangerous
because made with no fear of prosecution for perjury, and without the test of
cross-examination, which is the best method known to bring out the full and
exact truth. The fear of punishment after death is not now regarded as so
strong a safeguard against falsehood as it was when the rule admitting such
declarations was first laid down."
At the Old Bailey, in 1784, the court said dying declarations should be
admitted because "the mind, impressed with the awful idea of approaching
dissolution acts under a sanction equally powerful with that which it is
-presumed to feel by a solemn appeal to God upon an oath." King v. Drummond, Leach, 4th Ed., 337. Some modern courts are still of that view. In
State v. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767 (19o4), the court said: "A realization by the
declarant of the certain and speedy approach of death would be as powerful
an incentive on his part to tell the truth as would the administration of an
oath." However, even where dying declarations are favored, their competency
as evidence is open to the same objections and must be dealt with upon
the same principles as that of a living witness. Donnelly v. State, 26
N. J. L. 5o6 (1857).
In 24 Harvard Law Review 484, there is an interesting discussion of the
admissibility of dying declarations of persons who, for religious or other
reasons, have no fear of future punishment.
The New York opinion is an interesting reflection of the pragmatism of
the times.
FEDERAL COURTS5-VHERE

SUIT ON THE BOND OF A PUBLIC CONTRACTOR

BE BROUcHT.The Act of Congress of Feb. 24. 1905, amending the
Act of Aug. 13, 1894, provides that every person entering into a contract
with the United States for the construction of any public building or work,
shall execute a penal bond for the proper performance of the work,
and also for the payment of all sub-contractors or persons furnishing him
with materials. (U. S. Comp. Stat., Supp. 199o, p. 948.) The act provides
that suit upon such bond is to be brought in the district in which the contract is to be performed. However, it was always a mooted question whether
this applied to a suit brought on the bond by the sub-contractors in the name
of the United States. This has been settled by the recent case of United
States v. Congress Construction Co., 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44 (1912). The court
held that all suits upon such penal bonds must be brought in the district
where the contract was to be performed, regardless of sdch jurisdictional
facts as the amount of the claim, and the district where the defendant may
happen to reside. It also decides that the district court in which the suit
SHALL
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is brought shall have authority to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant through service of process upon him in whatever district he
may be found.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-SAFETY OF THE PREMISEs.-A sub-tenant sued
the lessor of premises for injuries caused by falling plaster, in Hill v.
Day, 8I Atlantic Rep. 58I (Me., 191i). It was held that there could be no
recovery in the absence of an agreement by the lessor to keep the premises in
repair. There was no implied warranty that the house was fit for use.
Even the breach of a covenant to repair does not ordinarily render the
lessor liable for personal injuries to the tenant, Miles v. Janvrin, I96 Mass.
431 (I9O7); Kusher v. Ginsberg, x88 N. Y. 63o (i9O5), unless such damages were contemplated by the parties, Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404
(igog), or the defect constitutes a menace to the safety of the tenant. Graff
v. Lemp, 145 Mo. App. 364 (igro). In some jurisdictions, however, the
sub-tenant cannot under any circumstances sue on the contract between the
tenant and the landlord. Brady v. Klein, 133 Mich. 422 (1903). But in
others he may do so, to avoid a circuity of actions. Schwandt v. Metzger
Co., 93 Ill. App. 365 (9oo).
When, however, the landlord assumes to make repairs he is liable in
tort for failure to use due care and skill, even though the repairs are
gratuitously made. Gill v. Middleton, 1o5 Mass. 477 (1870).
Where a landlord has knowledge of a defect not easily discoverable,
it is his duty to disclose it to the tenant. Howell v. Schneider, 24 App. D. C.

532 (1905); Morgan v. Sheppard, 156 Ala. 403 (i9o8); Miner v. McNamara,

81 Conn. 69o (igog); Rhoades v. Seidel, 139 Mich. 6o8 (I9o5). And in
such case the principle of caveat eniptor does not apply. Meyers v. Russell,
124 Mo. App. 317 (i9o7); Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569 (i9o2).

But this

does not cover defects which the. tenant could have discovered by active
investigation. Shinkle v. Birney, 68 Ohio St. 328 (19o3).
It has been held that the landlord is liable where he ought to have
known of the defect. Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148 (895).
But this
exception to the universal rule laid down in the principal case, has been
generally repudiated in the other. O'Malley v. Twenty-five Associates,
178 Mass. 555 (igoi); Whitmore v. Orono Co., 91 Me. 297 (1898); Franklin
v. Tracy, I17 Ky. 267 (19o4); Shinkle v. Birney, supra.
LIMITATION

OF ActIoNS-PART

PAYMENT

BY

ONE JOINT

OBLIGOR

AS

AFFECTING THE RUNNING 'OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST OTHER
JOINT OBLIGOIs.-Part payment on a joint promissory note was made by one

joint obligor without the knowledge and consent of his co-obligors. In a
suit against one of the latter on the note, the statute of limitations was pleaded
in bar, and it was held that a payment by one joint debtor cannot be considered an admission as against his co-obligor which would stop the running of
the statute. Monidah Trust v. Kemper, 118 Pac. 81I (Montana, I911).
The English rule was laid down by Lord Mansfield in Whitcomb v.
Whiting, 2 Doug. 652 (1781), that a payment made by one of two or more
joint contractors will remove the statutory bar as to all. This was changed
by Parliament in 1856, by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act (ig and 20
Vict., c 97).
In America today, the doctrine of VVhitcomb v. Whiting is almost universally repudiated. In many states statutes provide that no acknowledgment,
promise or part payment made by one joint debtor shall deprive the others
of the benefit of the statute; in others, statutes require the acknowledgment
to be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; and in a few
jurisdictions, judicial decisions have altered the rule.
The doctrine of the principal case may be briefly stated to be that one
co-debtor can neither suspend nor remove the statute by an acknowledgment

or part payment of a joint debt, without the direction, assent, or subsequent
ratification of his co-debtors. Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 219 (185O);
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Bush v. Stowell, 71 Pa. 208 (1872); Van Keuren v. Parmalee, 2 N. Y. 523
(1849); Bell v. Morrison, I Pet. 351 (U. S. 1828); Wood on Limitations,
p. 676.
Connecticut, New Jersey and Rhode Island do not follow this rule. Clark
v. Sigourney, i7 Conn. 511 (1846); Corlies v. Fleming, 3o N. J. L. 349 (z863);
Woonsocket Say. Inst. v. Ballou, I6 R. I. 35i (1888).
MASTER AND SERVANT-ExIsTENcF OF THE RELATION.-In Ash v. Century
Lumber Co., 133 N. W. Rep. 888 (Iowa, 1g1), it was held that the owner of
a wagon, who hires a team and driver, is not responsible for the negligent
conduct of the driver in the management of the team, when the driver is
left to drive the team in the manner of his own choosing or as directed by
the owner of the team.
In the first of the so-called "carriage cases," Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn.
& Cress. 547 (1826), Littledale, J., held that he is master who has the right
of control over the person inflicting the injury at the time it was inflicted.
This test has been generally adopted and was used by the court in the present
case.
Where the hirer has no control whatever over the driver otherwise than
to direct when and where he shall go, the owner of the hired team is held liable
on the ground that the driver remains the servant of his general employer,
as the right of control has not been transferred to the hirer. Stewart v.
California Imp. Co., 131 Cal. 125, (igoo) ; Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24 (1878) ;
Joslin v. Ice Co., 50 Mich. 517 (1883); Jahn's Admr. v. McKnight & Co., 117
Ky. 655 (i9o4) ; Frerker v. Nicholson. 41 Colo. T2 (r9o7) ; Kellogg v. Church
Charity Foundation, 96 N. E. 4o6 (N. Y., igri).
Where the hirer has complete control, having the right to put the driver
about other work or discharge him, the driver is held to have left the general
employment of the owner of the team and become temporarily the servant
of the hirer to whom has been transferred the ultimate right of control.

Brown v. Smith & Kelly, 86 Ga. 274 (i89o).

In cases where there is conflicting testimony as to whether or not the
right of control has been transferred, the question is left to the jury. P. & R.
C. & I. Co. v. Barrie, 179 Fed. 5o (igio); Howard v. Ludwig, 171 N. Y. 507
(xgo9).
Cases on this subject are collected in notes to Hardy v. Shedden Co., 65
L. R. A. I; Frerker v. Nicholson, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1122, and Morris v.
Tredo, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO ABUTTING PROPERTY

STREET.-During the course of the construction of a rapid transit subway, a sub-contractor negligently stored an
excessive quantity of dynamite in a shack on an inclosed part of the street.
The dynamite exploded and severely damaged abutting property. In an action
against the city, it was decided that the municipality was not liable, either
on the theory that the city had permitted a nuisance to be maintained in the
street, or that it was liable for the default of the fire department or bureau
of combustibles. Smyth v. City of New York, 96 N. E. Rep. 409 (igi).
In general a failure on the part of a municipality to exercise its charter
power to abate nuisances not rendering the streets themselves unsafe, does
not give a person who is injured thereby a private action against the corporation. Mansfield v. Brestor, 76 Ohio St. 270 (1907); Miller v. Newport
News, ioi Va. 432 (1904); 4 Dill. Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.), sec. 1628. But
municipal corporations have no absolute immunity from legal responsibility
for allowing the maintenance of a nuisance, and their liability may be predicated upon the facts of the particular case. Bolton v. New Rochelle, 8 Hun
281 (N. Y. 1895); Hart v. Union County, 57 N. J. L. 90 (r893). In the
principal case, the court held that the nuisance existed on a part of the street
withdrawn from the control of the municipality; but Haight, J., dissenting,
held that inasmuch as part of the same street was still open to public use,
CAUSED BY AN EXPLOSION IN A CLOSED
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this was immaterial and the city was liable for damages resulting from the
maintenance of this nuisance on the public highway. The statement that the
municipality was not liable for the default of the fire department, etc., while
correct, is not applicable in the discharge of non-delegable duties such as the
maintenance of safe highways in the principal case. The duty remains a
municipal one, and the police and fire departments are merely some of the
agencies through which the duty is discharged.
It is submitted that the city is not liable for a reason not assigned in the
discussion. The duty of maintaining highways in a safe condition is one
owed solely to users thereof, and not to all classes of citizens. Foi" injuries
from a breach of this duty, therefore, only those to whom the duty was owed
can have an action. Accordingly, since in the principal case the suit was for
damages to abutting property, the plaintiff was not in the category of those
competent to sue for the breach of duty owed only to the users of the
highway. Shearm. & Red., Neg. (4th Ed.), sec. 37o, and cases therein cited.
See also 4 Dill. Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.), pp. 3o19-3o34.
PARENT AND CHiLD-DESCENT OF PROPERTY OF ADOPTED CHILD.-Under a
statute providing that, by adoption, the legal relation of parent and child
shall be created, together with all the rights and duties of that relation; and
that the parents of the adopted child are, from the time of adoption, relieved
of all parental duties and responsibility, it was held that the adoptive mother
was entitled to inherit real estate from the adopted child. Calhoun v. Bryant,
133 N. W. 266 (S. D. x9iI).
Adoption is a creature of statute, imported from the civil law, and the
question of the right of inheritance of an adoptive parent depends upon the
rights conferred by the statutes. When the statute of adQption does not
expressly give the adoptive parents the right to inherit, there is a conflict of
authority.
In several jurisdictions it has been held that the general rules of descent
have not been changed. Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514 (1884); Upson v.
Noble, 35 Ohio 655 (i88o). The property involved in these cases had been
inherited from the natural parents, so" that no injustice was done by the
decisions. The same rule has been applied as to property inherited from one
of the adoptive parents. Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482 (1878).
In other jurisdictions the statutes of adoption have been construed as
changing the ordinary laws of inheritance by placing the adoptive parents in
the same position as the natural parents. The reason given is that the status
of parent and child determines the right of inheritance. Humphries v. Davis,

ioo Ind. 274 (1884).

In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania the statutes of adoption expressly
stipulate to whom the property of adopted children shall descend. In the
former state, all property acquired, by the adopted child himself, or from his
adopted parents, or their kindred, descends as though the adopted parents
were the natural parents; but property received from natural parents or their
kindred descends to them. Rev. Laws of Mass. 1368. In Pennsylvania only
property acquired from the adoptive parents descends to them. Act of Apr.
13th, 1887, P. L. 53.
PLEADING-DUPLICITY -The plaintiff, in one count, set forth six separate
and distinct acts of negligence, any one of which was sufficient, if proved, to
sustain a verdict. Held that the declaration was not bad for duplicity. Green
v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 133 N. W. Rep. 957 (Mich. I911).
It is settled, probably beyond dispute, in every jurisdiction today, that
the plaintiff may set forth in separate counts as many different acts of negligence as he sees fit, provided only, that they are not inconsistent. This is
the purpose of different counts. Whether or not these negligent acts can be
set out in the same count is an entirely different question.
Where one of the acts complained of is a breach of statutory duty and
the other act is a breach of common law duty, separate counts must be used.

458

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Otherwise the declaration is bad for duplicity. Matz v. Chicago & A. R. Co.,
88 Fed. 77o (i898) ; Haberlaw v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 73 I1. App. 261
(1897). Haley v. Missouri P. R. Co., 197 Mo. 15 (iqo6), contains a contrary dictum. Where the acts are breaches of common law duty alone, as in
the principal case, there is a greater diversity of opinion. The majority of
the decisions support Green v. R. R. Co. supra. Flynn v. Staples, 34 App.
D. C. 92 (D. of C. igog); Woodward Iron Co. v. Herndon, 114 Ala. i9t
(1896) ; Boireau v. Rhode Island Co., i69 Fed. 015 (i9o9); Seaboard Air
Line v. Rentz, 54 So. Rep. (Fla. ig1o); N. Y., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Robbins,
38 Ind. App. 172 (i9o6). The last case cited holds that proof of a single act
of negligence is sufficient to establish a case. Laporte v. Cooke, 2o R. 1. 261
(i897) is contrary to the principal case. Highland Ave. & B. Ry. Co. v.
Dussenburg, 94 Ala. 413 (x89i)
is also contra, but there the court held that
the several specifications of negligence were stated as disconnected faults,
each one being put forward as a separate ground of liability independent of
the others. In the other cases cited, the acts complained of were construed
as related and co-existent, tending to effect a single complete result.
PLEADING--EFFECT OF A RULING ON DEMURRER ON THE SUBSEQUENT AcTIoN
OF THE CouRT.-In Cooley v. Kelley, 96 N. E. Rep. 639 (Ind. rgiI), it was

held that it was not error for the trial court, after overruling the defendant's
demurrer to the declaration, to give a decision holding the declaration bad.
This is a rule followed in nearly all jurisdictions. Cummins v. Gray,
4 S. & P. 397 (Ala. 1833) ; Johnson v. Pensacola Co., 16 Fla. 623 (1878);
De La Beckwith v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 496 (1905); Perry v. Baker, 61
Neb. 841 (I9OI); Wiggin v. Federal Stock Co., 77 Conn. 507 (i9o5).

The

Illinois decisions have usually been cited as establishing a different rule, but
it is submitted that the cases that bear directly on the point are in accord
with the cases cited above. Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 Ill. 177
(1885) ; Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Ill. 553 (i9o5) ; Cook v. City of Marseilles, i39
Ill. App. 536 (i9o8).
Upon a demurrer where there is at least one pleading bad in substance
the whole record is opened and the court will give judgment against the party
who made the first substantial error. Schwab v. Furniss, 4 Sandford 704
(N. Y. 1852) ; Wyoming Co. v. Bardwell, 84 Pa. io4 (1877); State v. Moores,
52 Neb. 770 (1897) ; Railton v. Taylor, 20 R. I. 279 (1897); Wilhite v. Hamrick, 92 Ind. 594 (1883); Currier v. King, 81 Vt. .285 (i9o8); Massey v.
The People, 2oi 11. 4o9 (igo3).

The ruling of the court upon a demurrer to a pleading may be attacked
by one of the parties upon a subsequent demurrer. Sykes v. Lewis, 17 Ala.
261 (850); Lafayette Bridge Co. v. Streator, io5 Fed. 729 (i9oo), contra.
Ricknor v. Clabber, 4 Indian Terr. 66o (i9o3); Fish v. Farwell, x6o Ill. 236
(i896). The last case points out that its rule is not in conflict with Fort
Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, supra.
Where the declaration is defective in substance, the defendant does not,
by pleading the general issue, waive the right to attack the declaration upon
a demurrer subsequent to the defense. Auburn Canal Co. v. Leitch, 4 Denio,
65 (N. Y. 1847); Bishop v. Quintard, i8 Conn. 4o7 (1847); Smith v. Mulliken, 2 Minn. 319 (1858). Contra: Supreme Lodge v. McLennan, 171 Ill. 417
(1898).
REAL PROPERTY-EJECTMENT BY MORTGAGEE AGAINST MORTGAGOR.-In an
action of ejectment, the defendant showed a decree in chancery declaring
that the deed under which the plaintiff claimed was in fact a mortgage, in
which the plaintiff was mortgagee and the defendant, mortgagor. The
defendant did not prove that the debt was not due, or that it had been paid.
It was held that the defense was not sufficient, inasmuch as an action of
ejectment will lie by the mortgagee against the mortgagor after condition
broken. Ladd v. Ladd, et al., 96 N. E. Rep. 561 (I1. i911).
The decision is based on the principle that upon the execution of a

RECENT CASES
mortgage the legal estate rests in the mortgagee subject to a condition subsequent, namely, payment of the mortgage debt. This is followed in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 6 R. 1. 542 (I86o) ; Carroll v. Ballance, 26 Ill. 9 (1861) ;
Allen v. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263 (1869); Ten v. Stockton, 12 N. J.L. 322 (1831);
Pierce v. Brown, 24 Vt. I65 (1852).
The old common law went even further and held that in the absence of
a special provision that the mortgagor might retain possession until default,
the mortgagee might institute an action for the recovery of possession as
well before as after default. This rule has been adopted in a few states.
Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32 (I888); Hobart v. Sanborn, I3 N. H. 226
(1842); Colman v. Packard, 16 Mass. 39 (I8i).
Statutes as now enacted in a majority of the states, generally deny to a
mortgagee a remedy by ejectment. In those states a mortgagee has only a
lien, and it follows that he no longer possesses any right to possession, either
before or after condition broken, except as he may acquire it by a valid foreclosure or through the consent of the mortgagor. Howell v.' Leavitt, 95
N. Y. 617 (1884) ; Rountree v. Denson, 59 Wis. 522 (1884) ; Fox v. Wharton,
5 Del. Ch. 2oo (1878); McMahon v. Russell, 17 Fla. 698 (1879); Mack v.
Wetzlar, 39 Cal. 247 (187o); Duty v. Graham, 12 Tex. 427 (1854).
SALEs-LIABILITY

OF AN INFANT FOR BBEACH

OF WARRANTY.-In

a

suit

against an infant to recover damages for false representations in the sale
of a horse warranted to be sound, the complaint failed to allege that the
representations were made by the infant with "intent" to induce a purchase.
Held, that the complaint was based on a breach of warranty and the plaintiff could not recover on the theory that the infant was liable for damages
for deceit. Collins v. Gifford, 96 N. E. Rep. 721 (N. Y. 19II).
It is a fundamental rule that an infant is liable for his torts or frauds
just as any other person would be, infancy being unimportant except as it
may bear upon the question of malice or damages. Cooley on Torts, page 29.
But the fraudulent act with which the infant is charged must be wholly
tortious, for if the action is substantially grounded in contract the infant is
not liable. This doctrine has come down, though not without some little
opposition, from the early case of Johnson v. Pye, i Keble 9o5 (1666), to
the present day. In Green v. Greenbank, 2 Marsh. Rep. 485 (1816) the court
says, "Where the substantial ground of action rests on promises, the plaintiff cannot, by changing the form of action, render a person liable who would
not have been liable on his promise." This decision has been followed in
practically every jurisdiction where the question has arisen. Wilt v. Welsh,
6 Watts 9 (Pa. 1837) thoroughly reviews all the previous decisions. See
also, Morrill v. Aden, 19 Vt. 505 (1847); Robbins v. Mount, 3 How. Prac.
(N. Y. 1867); Lowery v. Cate, io8 Tenn. Rep. 61 (i9oi). Contra: Ward v.

Vance, i Nott & McCord, 197 (S. C. I818).
In Bristow v. Eastman, iEs. Rep. 172 (1787), an action against an infant
for money had and received was held good, the court holding that though
the action was, in form, ex contractu, it was in substance ex delicto and
infancy was no bar. In Campbell v. Stakes, 2 Wend. 139 (N. Y. 1828), an
action of trespass for wilful injury to a horse hired by the defendant was
sustained, the court holding that the wilful act amounted to an election on
the part of the infant to disaffirm the contract, and entitled the owner to
immediate possession. See also, Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492 (Mass. 1826).
ToRTs-CoPARATIVE NEGLIGENcCE-In an action for damages for personal
injuries, the jury found, in a special verdict, that the plaintiff had not been
guilty of contributory negligence. The lower court set aside this finding.
It was held that under a statute the defendant was entitled to a finding of
the jury on the comparative negligence of the parties. This question should
have been submitted to the jury after their finding was set aside. Schendel
v. Chicago, &c., Ry., 133 N. W. Rep. 830 (Wis. 1911).
The doctrine of comparative negligence is recognized in a few juris-
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dictions. The author of the negligence is the party to whom the greater
fault must be attributed. Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 6io (i858). The
plaintiff is entitled to recover where his contributory negligence is slight as
compared with that of the defendant. Ditberner v. Chicago, &c., Ry., 47 Wis.
138 (1871). Where the complainant is at fault the damages will be reduced
in proportion to such fault except in the case of gross negligence. Central
Co. v. Smith, 78 Ga. 694 (1887); Western R.R.v. Abbott, 74 Ga. 851 (i885).
Most jurisdictions have, however, refused to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. O'Keefe v. Chicago, &c., Ry., 32 Iowa 467 (1871) ; Artz
v. Chicago, &c., Ry., 38 Iowa 293 (1874) ; Marble v. Ross, i24 Mass. 44 (1877) ;
Hurt v. St. Louis, &c., Ry., 94 Mo. 255 (1887); Penna. Co. v. Righter, 42
N. J. L. i8o (T88o); Reynolds v. Ry- Co., 8 Misc. Rep. 313 (N. Y. 1894);
Potter v. Warner, 91 Pa. 362 (1879).
WILLSEFFECT

OF DISCLAIMER OF LIFE ESTATE UPON

THE VESTING OF

a recent English case, Re Sir Walter Scott, 105 L. T. 577
(Dec. 1911), the testator devised realty to the use of his eldest son for life,
remainder to the use of his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to
the use of his grandson. The eldest son disclaimed his life estate. He was
married but had no children. It was held that under the Contingent
Remainder Act, the contingent remainder in tail male was not destroyed by
the failure of the particular estate. The estate in the grandson did not take
effect in possession until the death of the eldest son without issue, the rents
and profits in the meanwhile passing under the residuary clause of the will.
The case of Carrich v. Errington, 2 P. Wins. 361 (i726), where a similar
decision was reached under a trust to preserve contingent remainders is
authority for the principal case.
Although many American states have passed statutes to the effect that
no expectant estate can be defeated or barred by the act of the holder of
the present estate (see Stimson Amer. St. Law, sec. 1403), no exactly similar
case seems to have arisen. The cases most closely resembling it in principle are those where a life estate has been given to a widow with remainder
over, and the widow has elected to take against the will. In such cases the
remainder is usually accelerated. Baptist Female University v. Borden, 132
N. C. 476 (903); Randall v. Randall, 85 Ind. 430 (i897). But where the
class in which the remainder is vested is unascertained until the death of the
life tenant there is no acceleration. Rodgers v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
97 Md. 676 (19o3); In re Lawrence's Estate, 37 Misc. 702 (N. Y. i9o2).
In Parker v. Ross, 69 N. H. 213 (1898), a remainder to children took effect
in possession on the renunciation by the widow, subject to be divested by
their death prior to that of the widow. This decision seems contra to that
of the principal case.
REmAIwDms.-In

